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ACFTU: BEYOND REFORM? THE SLOW MARCH OF DIRECT ELECTIONS 
By Jude Howell (China Quarterly 2008) 
 
Since the mid-1990s trade union leaders in Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shandong and other 
coastal provinces have been quietly introducing direct elections for grassroots trade 
union cadres. Their goal has been to nurture a stratum of grassroots trade union cadres 
who prioritise workers’ interests over Party and/or national interests. In essence it is a 
subtle attempt to democratise the trade union from within, transforming it from an 
administrative machine subservient to the Party into an effective organisation for 
interest group representation. In many respects direct trade union elections echo the 
idea of competitive village leadership elections. Yet they have not been generalised 
across the country or institutionalised through legislation or drawn droves of 
international observers in the way that village elections did in the 1980s and 1990s. 
What might have promised to be China’s `second silent revolution’ has failed to take 
off. This paper explores the political, structural and institutional reasons behind the 
piecemeal and slow spread of direct basic union elections in China. In doing so it 
analyses the parameters constraining the reform of the All-China Federation of Trades 
Unions (ACFTU) in the direction of a more effective, worker-oriented organisation. 
 
The paper begins by identifying the key organisational features of the ACFTU that 
frame trade union activism and distinguish it from trade unions in liberal democratic 
contexts. The most salient of these are Leninist classic dualism, state corporatism and 
bureaucratic welfarism, features that, as will be seen, are potentially challenged in one 
fell swoop by direct elections for grassroots trade union cadres. In the second section 
we examine the arguments levered by reformist leaders within the ACFTU to push the 
idea of direct elections of basic trade union cadres in China. In the third section we 
analyse the complex nexus of structural, institutional and political factors that have 
combined to thwart the widespread implementation and institutionalisation of direct 
elections of grassroots trade union cadres in China.  
 
The paper draws on the findings of fieldwork carried out in 2003 and 2004 in Beijing 
and two southern provinces, which have spearheaded experiments with direct 
democratic elections.  The research focuses on the perspectives of trade union cadres 
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on the processes of change within the ACFTU, and specifically regarding direct 
elections. Twenty-three in-depth, qualitative interviews were conducted with relevant 
key informants in provincial, town and enterprise trade unions. Though not a 
representative sample for all of China, the interviews in these provinces pioneering 
direct elections illustrate the constraints and possibilities for organisational change
i
. 
 
Throughout the paper the term `direct elections’ (zhijie xuanju) refers to the process 
whereby workers nominate any number of candidates to stand for trade union 
positions such as trade union committee member, vice-chair and chair. This echoes 
the `sea elections’ (haixuan) method pioneered in village elections and was 
considered by our informants to be the most democratic. Workers then vote directly 
for their preferred candidates, who should muster more than half of the vote, again 
reflecting village elections. In practice direct elections embrace a range of practices, 
from the more democratic sea elections method to more dubious processes, reflecting 
the contested  nature of the concept
ii
. This system aims to replace Party control [the 
Party is the one which allows this to happen. I am not sure whether this is the aimof 
the system as the system is controlled by the party.] over the appointment of 
grassroots trade union cadres.  
.    
I. Understanding the parameters of change 
 
There is general agreement amongst scholars that the ACFTU departs in significant 
ways from trade unions in Western liberal democracies
iii
. In particular the ACFTU is 
the only officially recognised trade union in China and enjoys therefore a monopoly in 
the representation of workers’ interests. Given its close structural relationship with the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it lacks the independence of trade unions in liberal 
democratic states, which is vital if unions are to articulate and promote effectively the 
interests of their members
iv
. The growth of a significant domestic and foreign private 
manufacturing sector, the decline of state enterprises and the massive flows of rural 
migrant workers to the industrial heartlands of eastern China over the last three 
decades of reform have altered fundamentally the context within which the ACFTU 
operates (Cai 2002, Chan and Zhu 2003, Chan 2000, 2001, Lee 1999, Pun 2005, Qiao 
2002, Sheehan 1998). Faced with a rising number of workers’ strikes, protests, 
demonstrations (Chen 2000, Howell 1997a, b, 2003, Lee 2007, Pan 2002, Weston 
2004, Thireau and Hua 2003) and workers’ self-organising (Xie 2002, Howell 2004), 
and concerned about the threats to social stability, the CCP has urged the ACFTU to 
play a more prominent role in protecting workers’ rights, but always within the 
parameters of accepting Party leadership [But where does the Party stand? The author 
should disuss the vantage point of the Party. If the Party stands on the side of the 
workers, then there is no problem. .] Compared to other mass organisations such as 
the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) or the Communist Youth League (CYL), 
the ACFTU has been slow to adapt to the many new challenges it faces in a rapidly 
growing market economy (Howell 2000).  
 
Nevertheless it would be wrong to say that the ACFTU has not changed over the past 
thirty years
v
, that it has not initiated and contributed to significant reforms in the 
legislative and regulatory framework governing labour relations in China or that it has 
not strengthened its institutional position in the administrative hierarchy
vi
.  As these 
changes have already been well expounded in other texts (Chan 1993, Howell 1997a, 
2003, Taylor, Chang and Li 2003), suffice it here to highlight the key crisis moment 
in the post-reform history of the ACFTU during the democracy movement of 1989 
when ACFTU leaders mediated between protesting workers and Party leaders, thereby 
bolstering their claims to represent workers’ interests and disturbing the balance of 
their relationship with the Party
vii
. At the same time more radical trade union cadres 
and workers set up autonomous trade unions. Following the clampdown on the 1989 
democracy movement, the ACFTU came under sharp criticism from the then 
dominant conservative faction in the Party (Wilson 1990b:61). Party leaders 
recognised, however, that a more effective and democratic ACFTU that remained 
under the leadership of the Party was still preferable to an independent trade union 
beyond Party control. They astutely conceded more access to the policy-making 
process, greater influence in the enterprise and greater space to take up workers’ 
grievances in return for accepting Party leadership. As White, Howell and Shang 
(1996:51-52) note, this was a Faustian bargain `in which the unions linked their 
fortunes and future to those of the Party’. With the re-ascendancy of Deng and his 
allies from 1992 onwards, the more progressive wing of the ACFTU emerged out of 
their post-Tiananmen crevices and began to push again for legislation that would 
better protect workers. However Party exhortation was still not enough to equip 
grassroots trade union cadres with the political and ideological tools to handle the 
conflicting pressures from workers, Party officials and management nor enough to 
protect them against the threat of job dismissal if they did conscientiously take the 
side of workers.  
 
Thus the process of organisational change has been slow and halting, often with one 
step forwards and two steps backwards, and significantly shaped by political and 
ideological struggles within the Party leadership, institutional and structural factors.  
The pressures for greater autonomy have come from radical [an over-statement to call 
them “radical”. “Reformist” is more appropriate] leaders within the ACFTU, 
sympathetic journalists and labour scholars, and from grassroots trade unionists, who 
are at the coalface of an increasingly pronounced dualist dilemma. Given the 
sensitivity of labour issues and the Party’s fear of any emerging independent trade 
union movement akin to Solidarity
viii
, the ACFTU, when compared to the CYL or 
ACWF, confronts particularly stringent constraints on internal reform. Three 
constraints stand out: first, the transmission belt role of the trade union and the classic 
dualist dilemma this poses; second, the state corporatist nature of the ACFTU; and 
third, its bureaucratic welfarism. These variables shape at all levels the behaviour and 
attitudes of trade union cadres to their work and hence the effectiveness of the 
organisation in defending workers’ interests.  
 
In his seminal work on the ACFTU Paul Harper (1969) discusses in detail the 
structural dilemma posed by the Leninist transmission belt model of trade unionism. 
In this model the trade union functions as an intermediary, mass organisation, 
transmitting Party policy and directives downwards to workers and in turn reflecting 
workers’ interests upwards to the Party. As Harper and others have noted, such a 
model could serve the interests of workers well in an ideal world. However these twin 
objectives, that Pravda and Ruble (1986: 1-21) refer to as `classic dualism’ix, are often 
contradictory, so that in practice, trade union cadres under pressure from above have 
tended to prioritise the interests of the Party and the nation over those of its worker 
constituency. In the reform period these contradictory functions have become 
increasingly difficult to reconcile, with trade union cadres being pulled and pushed in 
different directions. This has been become particularly pronounced during the closure 
of state enterprises and in disputes in private sector enterprises, where trade union 
cadres have more often than not aligned with Party policy than taken up the 
grievances of workers.  
 
The second key characteristic of the ACFTU is its state corporatist nature. Philippe 
Schmitter developed the idea of corporatism as a way of theoretically conceptualising 
variations in state formations. According to Schmitter (1979: 93-94) corporatism 
refers to:  
 
“…a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or 
licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support”.  
 
Given that there is only one officially recognised trade union federation in China, that 
any attempts to establish alternative trade unions have always been quickly nipped in 
the bud and that the CCP exerts considerable control over the union, then the ACFTU 
can aptly be described as a corporatist institution. Moreover, because of the classic 
dualism noted above, the ACFTU is better described as a state corporatist institution 
rather than a societal corporatist institution
x
 which gives precedence to the 
representation of worker interests’, autonomous and voluntary organisation.  
 
Labelling the ACFTU as state corporatist is, however, static. It reveals little about 
how an institution can move from a state to societal corporatist model or indeed to a 
pluralist, civil-society type model where numerous, voluntarily formed trade unions 
vie for influence over government. Indeed Schmitter (1979:126-7) is pessimistic about 
the possibility of any peaceful and incremental transformation from a state corporatist 
to societal corporatist regime. Pravda and Ruble (1976) are more optimistic about the 
possibilities, though concede that any move towards `adversarial non-dualism’ is most 
likely to occur in a context of radicalisation and regime challenge (p. 19). Over the 
last fifty years there have been key moments when more radical leaders in the 
ACFTU have pressed for greater autonomy from the Party so as to represent more 
effectively workers’ interests. In the 1950s Li Lisan and later Lai Ruoyu, both chairs 
of the ACFTU, attempted in vain to wrest the union from Party control. Such 
moments are historical steps in the direction of a state corporatism that tilts more 
towards workers’ interests, or in other words a `societal state corporatism’. However 
it is only when there is a fundamental challenge to the regime, such as in the late 
1980s in Eastern Europe or during the Democracy Movement of 1989 in China when 
worker activists and radical trade unionists set up autonomous trade unions that the 
possibility of a shift from state to societal corporatism can come about. In the case of 
China, such a moment was short-lived. In the absence of regime change, we can 
expect state corporatist unions such as the ACFTU to change gradually, with periods 
of advance and retreat as the Party alternately cedes or retrieves control.  
  
The third feature of the ACFTU is its bureaucratic welfarism. The ACFTU is a large, 
administrative machine, with a membership of over 150 million. As its leaders at all 
levels are predominantly Party members, the lines between Party and mass 
organisation are heavily blurred. At the local level leading trade union cadres are 
appointed by the local Party committee. They receive instructions and pressures from 
both local Party authorities and from the central ACFTU, with the former usually 
wielding greater authority over local trade unionists. The incentives to cadres to 
perform well come from the Party above rather than from workers below.  
 
Up till the reform period state and collective ownership predominated in China. Trade 
union cadres operated like an arm of the administration in the state-led economy, a 
point that Ni Zhifu, then Chair of the ACFTU, underlined vociferously in his speech 
at the 11
th
 ACFTU Congress in 1988 (Wilson, 1990b: 55)
xi
. Their main duties were 
ensuring production, safeguarding the welfare of workers, organising cultural and 
leisure activities, administering the labour insurance fund, and relaying Party policies. 
Trade unions were established in state and collective enterprises as a matter of course 
and under Maoism there could be no fundamental contradiction of interests between 
workers and the state. Most state workers enjoyed an iron rice bowl and wages, and 
benefits and working conditions were determined through central policies.  
Compared with trade unions in capitalist economies, trade union cadres had no need 
to develop the skills of establishing trade unions, of mobilising workers to join a trade 
union
xii, of identifying and articulating workers’ interests, of challenging exploitative 
managers, or of raising funds to support union activities. Though workers in the 1950s 
and 1960s harboured grievances that sometimes erupted into conflict (Perry 1994), the 
Party’s perception of their threat to social stability cannot be compared with the 
situation post-reform. The gradual bureaucratisation of the ACFTU over half a 
century and its welfarist orientation have led to an institutional inertia which has 
seriously impeded any shift towards a more societal state corporatist or civil society-
type organisation. Grassroots trade union cadres have therefore lacked the skills and 
incentives to deal with workplace issues that would be part and parcel of everyday 
trade union life in liberal capitalist societies.  
 
Classic dualism, state corporatism and bureaucratic welfarism are persistent features 
of the ACFTU that have combined to constrain any initiatives to make the union more 
representative and vocal on behalf of workers
xiii
. Though the ACFTU has 
strengthened its bureaucratic position considerably during the reform period and 
played a visible role in promoting workers’ interests, it still lacks legitimacy amongst 
Chinese workers and is widely held to be ineffective in representing, articulating or 
protecting workers’ rights. As Chan (1993: 58-59) noted, the efforts of trade union 
leaders to protect workers’ interests since the 1980s and even their actions during the 
radical 1989 movement seemed to have made little impression on workers. Moreover 
most foreign-owned enterprises and domestic private enterprises do not have any 
trade union representation. Even where trade union branches exist in the private sector, 
the chairs are frequently relatives or friends appointed by the owner. Trade union 
cadres generally have little role in organising the increasing number of spontaneous 
strikes and protests across China around unpaid wages, excessive overtime or 
enterprise closures. Many migrant workers have no idea what the role of the ACFTU 
is and do not see themselves as part of the Chinese working class because of their 
rural origins. There are thus two deep gaps: first, between the actual efforts made by 
the ACFTU to reform, albeit piecemeal and slow, and the perception of these by 
workers; and second, between the legislative reforms and other initiatives that have 
been pushed by the ACFTU to protect workers’ rights and the role of trade unions in 
ensuring their implementation.  
 
It is against this background that the move towards direct elections looks particularly 
innovative and promising for workers. Unlike other attempts at reform within the 
ACFTU, direct elections aim to change the very nature of grassroots trade union 
cadres by making them accountable to workers. In doing so they would knock on the 
head the three key constraints outlined above. First, by making grassroots trade union 
cadres answerable to workers, this would increase the pressure on cadres to prioritise 
workers’ interests, thus addressing the classic dualist dilemma. Second, with cadres 
becoming more responsive to workers the elections could provide a way of shifting 
the union towards a more societal version of state corporatism or even towards a civil-
society type institution. Third, with incentives geared towards meeting workers’ 
interests rather than bureaucratic orders and towards addressing workers’ grievances 
in the workplace rather than just administering welfare, the elections would provide a 
mechanism for undermining bureaucratic welfarism. In the next section we examine 
more closely the rationale behind direct elections as expressed by reformist trade 
union leaders. 
 
II. The Case for Direct Democratic Elections (2,221 words) 
 
Support for direct elections has come from what we call the reform-wing of the 
ACFTU associated with leaders such as Hao Wen Cai, with backing and support from 
sympathetic Party leaders, intellectuals based in labour research institutes such as 
China Industrial Relations College and centres based at Beijing Normal University 
and People’s University, and journalists. A key protagonist of direct elections has 
been the chair of the ACFTU Department for the Construction of Grassroots 
Organisations, Hao Wen Cai. Hao has maintained that the experiments with direct 
elections in foreign-invested enterprises are in line with ACFTU law and constitution, 
with the democratisation and `mass-isation’ of China, and that direct elections are the 
future path for trade union elections in China (Xinhua 2003a). Other key supporters of 
direct elections are some provincial-level trade unions leaders, particularly in coastal 
provinces such as Guangdong, Zhejiang and Shandong. Indeed, as a senior official in 
the ACFTU observed, `it is the localities that are pushing the elections’xiv rather than 
the centre.   
 
Reformers within the ACFTU have been acutely aware of the gap between the 
changes at the macro-level and the capacity of grassroots trade union cadres to 
respond to the grievances of workers. Rather than changing this just through political 
exhortation and rhetoric, the reformers are seeking to alter the incentive structure that 
operates at grassroots level, where cadres have to deal directly with workers’ 
grievances.  By introducing direct elections they intend to generate a new layer of 
grassroots trade unions cadres that is closer to workers, more passionate about 
workers’ rights and more accountable. Moreover, by widening the pool of candidates 
there is more scope for competent and popular leaders to be elected, an argument used 
also in support of village elections. In this way they hope to overcome the enduring 
problem of workers’ alienation from the union as a result of bureaucratisation and 
Party dominance.  A senior official in the ACFTU illustrated these points to us with 
reference to an American enterprise, Haofu Taigu Yuhang Company in Xiamen, 
where the workers voted out of office the unpopular incumbent trade union chair. 
 
Provincial trade union leaders we interviewed suggested that having to make a speech 
before a worker’s assembly about their actions and intentions, and to respond to 
spontaneous questions from workers, makes candidates more aware of and 
accountable to workers’ interests. As the vice-head of province A trade union stated:  
 `He [the elected candidate] thinks “I’ve been elected by everyone” and often 
he made promises in his election speech about what he would do for everyone. If he 
can’t keep his promises, will people vote for him again? He feels responsible towards 
his members, has quite a strong sense of responsibility to people below. If it’s the 
converse, as in our former system, he would be responsible upwards and so his 
attitude towards the trade union, to trade union work, to trade union organising, all 
would be different. In this way [direct elections], the trust of employees in the trade 
union and the cohesiveness are quite strong’xv.  According to a senior official in the 
ACFTU, direct elections are already having an effect on the behaviour of trade union 
cadres,  `These chairs have changed from being in the past `[they [i.e. higher-level 
authorities]] want me to do’ to `I want to do’ (zhe xie zhuximen, you Hao qu de “yao 
wo gan” zhanbian wei “wo yao gan”), thus redressing the balance of interests 
towards workers. Of course such comments reflect the optimism of reformers who are 
keen to see change in the ACFTU. How much has actually changed from the point of 
workers is another story that requires rigorous and systematic investigation
xvi
. 
Nevertheless a vital ingredient in pushing reform forwards is the visionary leadership 
that can persuasively argue and strategise for change.  
 
A second motive given by trade union leaders for direct elections relates to expanding 
the trade union base in the private sector. Apart from the difficulties of establishing a 
trade union in a private company, where owners have been notoriously reluctant to 
allow unionisation, trade unionists face the added problem of having to mobilise a 
predominantly rural, migrant workforce that knows little about the role of a trade 
union. Advocates of direct elections thus maintain that through the preparatory work 
for direct elections the ACFTU can raise awareness amongst migrant workers about 
the role of a trade union. Direct elections, too, can, they argue, increase workers’ 
consciousness of being both a trade union member and part of the working class and 
so dilute the influence of a place-based identity that hinders the development of class 
consciousness.   
 
Third, reformers in the ACFTU hope that grassroots elections will stabilise labour 
relations and reduce spontaneous unrest
xvii
.   As several respondents pointed out, 
workers are more likely to heed leaders that they respect and have directly elected 
than distant leaders appointed from above
xviii
. Whilst there is a risk, as with village 
elections, that popular leaders may be overzealous in representing their 
constituencies’ interests, they also make it easier for higher-level authorities to exert 
control downwards. For the ACFTU direct elections offer a way of strengthening the 
links between the higher and lower levels of the organisation, extending its base to the 
private sector, and enhancing the motivation of grassroots cadres through greater 
accountability to workers.  
 
Fourth, trade union reformers at national and local levels justify direct elections of 
trade union cadres as part of a broader trend towards `democratisation’ and 
`massisation’ [need to find another word. This is not an English word] (qunzhonghua) 
of state and quasi-state structures in China. The idea of trade union elections forms 
part of a more general process of reform and modernisation that includes village 
elections, community elections, experimentation with elections for village Party 
branches and township leaders, and public hearings. All these are aimed at enhancing 
the downward accountability and legitimacy of Party-state institutions through 
extended participation, and when convenient, at bolstering China’s diplomatic 
armoury to counter external criticism of its democratic credentials.  Local trade 
unionists can tactically appropriate this argument to justify pushing local experiments 
in direct elections.  
 
Finally, the reform wing of the ACFTU sees direct elections as a way of gaining more 
independence for the union so that it can deal more effectively with workers’ 
grievances and interests. As the vice-head of a provincial trade union remarked, 
`several people in the trade union say “the trade union keeps cool under the big tree”’, 
that is, it enjoys the protection of the Party and is thus not an independent organisation. 
If the trade union is to work more independently, then the reforms have to begin from 
below and as the vice-head suggested, “we need to find a balance between the Party 
and the trade union”xix. Direct trade union elections are therefore one way of 
promoting a more independent role for the trade union.  
 
Given the sensitivities around trade union reform, particularly in relation to Party 
leadership, reformers have set about quietly introducing direct elections. Drawing on 
the experiences of Shekou Special Economic Zone
xx
, which first experimented with 
direct elections in 1986, and later pilots, the ACFTU drew up a document entitled 
`Basic Thoughts on Trade Union Reform (gonghui gaige de jiben shexiang) that was 
issued at the Sixth Meeting of the 10
th
 Executive Session of the ACFTU on 9
th
 
October 1988 (Wang 2003). Clause 43, chapter 7 of this document proposed that TU 
leaders at all levels should be democratically elected and that members of grassroots 
trades unions members with appropriate conditions could directly elect their leaders. 
However due to the turbulent events of 1989 and the accusation of ACFTU 
involvement in the protests, this document was not implemented.  The reformers had 
to wait until the political context eased up before they could push forward with 
electoral reforms.  
 
Following Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992 and the political signal this gave of 
waning conservative influence, the reformers seized the opportunity to issue the 
`Implementing regulations for TU Grassroots Organisations Election Work’. Five 
years later the ACFTU issued `Opinions on some core issues in advancing trade union 
reform and construction’, in which Clause 15 again stated that in small and medium 
enterprises, the trade union chair, vice-chair and committee should be directly elected 
through the workers’ or representative assembly.  These Opinions encouraged more 
local trade unions to experiment with direct elections and throughout the 1990s direct 
elections gradually spread to other provinces such as Zhejiang, Shandong and Fujian 
(Xinhua 2003b).   
 
So far reformers within the central ACFTU and provincial leaderships have allowed 
grassroots trades unions to quietly get on with elections, trying out different methods. 
In Zhejiang province, for example, a senior trade union cadre explained how in their 
local document on electoral methods, they state that only “sea elections”, as in the 
village elections, are genuine, direct elections, whilst the 1992 ACFTU document on 
methods states that direct elections includes trade union committee members electing 
their chair
xxi
. In this way local leaders have pushed ahead of the central trade union, 
using the model of village elections, to `democratise’ elections at grassroots level. 
However, provincial leaders have astutely avoided giving too much publicity to the 
different experiments, judging that this would only draw the attention of unwanted 
eyes in the central ACFTU and potential disapproval, thereby jeopardising these 
efforts
xxii
.   
 
However despite the efforts of reform-minded trade union leaders to promote direct 
elections, they have not spread with the alacrity of village elections, nor created a 
vocal bottom-up demand from workers to extend these elections to their enterprises in 
the way that villagers have demanded the right to choose their leaders or urban-
dwellers have demanded to elect their leaders. Nor have they drawn much attention 
internationally. Whilst the advocates of village elections skilfully played the 
international card to their advantage, letting foreign journalists and scholars report on 
the bottom-up democratisation of China, trade union reformers have been much more 
cautious in their approach. In the next section we look more closely at the reasons for 
the different trajectory of direct trade union elections in China.  
 
III Obstacles to Direct Democratic Elections 
 
Political, institutional and structural factors have contributed to the snail-pace spread 
of the more democratic direct elections for grassroots trade union leaders. Though 
some press reports and interviewees claim that direct elections have been widely 
carried out, with some reports putting the figure in Guangdong province in 2003 
already at one third
xxiii
, without independent investigation this is hard to verify, 
especially given the varied methods used as described by our informants. Resistance 
to the reforms from within the ACFTU was already surfacing in the run-up to the 14
th
 
ACFTU Congress in 2002 when, it is rumoured, that the Congress Vice-Chair, Hao 
Wen Cai, was criticised for promoting direct elections
xxiv
. The issue of democratic 
direct elections generated considerable debate at this Congress and divisions within 
the central leadership and lower levels continue to influence the trajectory of the 
elections. Hao referred at the Congress to the drafting of a document on direct 
elections, namely, `Regulations on Direct Elections of Grassroots Trade Union 
Chairs’. Stating that the ACFTU constitution allowed workers to directly elect their 
trade union leaders, Hao reported that these new regulations would furnish the 
necessary detailed guidelines on basic procedures, requirements for candidates and 
other matters
xxv
. Yet, as of spring 2007, these regulations are still being drafted. 
 
Opponents and more cautious reformers such as Su Weiqing, ACFTU head, have 
mustered three key and related arguments to attack the idea of direct democratic 
elections. First, they have charged that foreign companies have deliberately tried to 
promote direct elections in their factories so as to destabilise China. In an interview in 
July 2003 Su criticised foreign companies for requiring direct elections of trade union 
leaders as a condition for receiving their orders or following audits of labour rights 
and accused them of interfering in China’s internal affairs (Wang 2003). This, he 
suggested, was not in accordance with the Trade Union Law or Constitution.  His 
underlying concern was that foreign forces were seeking to establish a `second’ trade 
union that would be independent of the CCP and challenge the authority of the 
ACFTU. This anxiety needs to be interpreted within a broader context where the 
Chinese leadership was closely following the Colour Revolutions in Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. No doubt this must have brought back memories of the rise 
of Solidarity in Poland. Putin’s declarations that Western governments had had a hand 
in promoting these revolutions and his subsequent clampdown on NGOs in Russia 
resonated with the Chinese leadership, which in turn has instigated investigations of 
foreign foundations and NGOs in China. The idea that foreigners might be involved in 
organising workers was therefore deeply worrying for the Party. 
 
The second argument used by opponents of direct elections is economic. It is 
suggested that by drawing attention to poor labour standards and the absence of free 
trade unions in China, foreign companies are surreptitiously seeking to raise labour 
costs and thereby undermine China’s competitiveness. The discourse of corporate 
social responsibility and along with that, direct elections in supplier factories to 
foreign companies are for some trade unionists and Party leaders merely a device to 
protect Western markets
xxvi
.  
 
The third issue in the armoury of opponents and more cautious reformers revolves 
around political stability. Here the argument runs that direct elections will produce 
weak, incompetent or politically risky leaders, who will be unable or unwilling to 
moderate workers’ demands and, most importantly, will be beyond Party control. Or, 
it is argued, workers will tend to elect leaders who belong to the same clan or native-
place, which will only fuel clan and place-based tensions within factories and 
undermine the cohesion of the trade union.   
 
Given that the more radical reformers have not been able to institutionalise the 
elections through the promulgation of regulations for the elections, a compromise 
position has been reached. For the moment the ACFTU has taken an intermediate 
position towards direct elections, suggesting that they are appropriate in small and 
medium-sized enterprises, state enterprises and public units, but less appropriate in 
private or foreign-invested enterprises
xxvii. However the phrase `less appropriate’ does 
not mean that they are prohibited, suggesting that the reformers have managed to keep 
open the possibilities for experimentation at the local level. Furthermore, Su Weiqing 
and other leaders in the ACFTU have kept open the space for this reform by claiming 
ownership of the idea of direct elections and challenging the notion seemingly 
conveyed in the media that direct elections are the brainchild of foreign 
companies
xxviii
. 
 
Leaders such as Su Weiqing are more cautious than some lower level officials, not 
completely opposing the idea but seeking to restrain those more radical reformers who 
want to see faster and more widespread implementation. These cautious reformers 
thus prefer a path of gradually pushing forward the elections through a process of 
preliminary investigations, summarising the results, identifying models and then 
guiding the localities to implement elections in a standard way, starting out with small 
and medium sized enterprises
xxix. This is reflected in Su’s 2003 interview where he 
states that candidates should meet certain conditions, such as the six requirements laid 
down in the constitution of the ACFTU
xxx
, thereby reminding more radical reformers 
in the union of the principle of Party leadership (Wang 2003). To cap this, he goes on 
to say that the ultimate goal is to improve the intermediary, bridging role of the TU 
between workers and the Party, rather than to establish the autonomy of the TU from 
the Party per se
xxxi
.  
 
The effects of these national-level tensions around the direct elections level have 
become manifest in the unease of some national trade union leaders when media 
coverage is given to the success of direct elections in the provinces
xxxii
. Furthermore 
some local level trade union leaders have become cautious about introducing direct 
elections when the process is not legitimated through directives from above. For some 
reformers, the lack of authoritative institutionalisation of direct elections and the slow 
pace in producing detailed documentation has led to frustration with the process.
xxxiii
. 
For others, however, the absence of any detailed document from the central level on 
how to organise elections, has provided an opening to take the lead in issuing detailed 
regulations on electoral procedures and pushing ahead with direct elections, albeit 
with some caution
xxxiv
. Indeed it is noteworthy that in Guangdong province the 
provincial trade union has stipulated that direct elections can be promoted first in 
foreign-invested enterprises, and especially in TNCs, thus contradicting the central 
recommendations. 
 
As a result the methods for selecting candidates
xxxv
, electoral procedures, and 
candidate requirements vary considerably across places and enterprises, a 
phenomenon that also characterised village elections, particularly in the first decade.  
This has led to considerable confusion amongst trade union officials as to what can be 
genuinely called a `democratic direct election’. Two contrasting situations in a 
clothing foreign-invested enterprise and a printing factory in town H as recounted by 
the respective enterprise trade unionists illustrate this well. 
 
The clothing factory has a workforce of approximately 2,500, of whom 1,000 are 
trade union members
xxxvi
. It is important to provide more information on this (and the 
other) factory and the entire election procedure. This should be the core of the paper, 
but there is very little meat in it. For instance, at least state the ownership of the 
factory. This has big repercussions on the election. Who did the nomination? Just the 
workers? In the other factory looks like the nomination process was totally controlled. 
The factory is divided into five `electoral wards’, based on several workshops and 
embracing from as 56 to over 500 workers in each. Each electoral ward nominates 
candidates to be member representatives and has to vote in 24 representatives per 
ward. You mean even a ward of 56 people could nominate 24 representatives? Then it 
was not proportional representation. In the electoral ward of the vice-trade union chair, 
Who was the vice chair? Did he/she self-nominate? Or nomited by the workers? Or by 
management? Or by upper level trade union? there were over 500 workers and around 
40 people reportedly put themselves forward as candidates. These candidates gave 
speeches and responded to questions. The 120 member representatives then elected 20 
trade union committee members. Was the election by secret ballot? Was the vote 
counting transparent? The newly elected trade union committee in turn voted for the 
chair and vice-chair from a list of self-appointed candidates from the committee. Was 
this second section transparent?  In all elections the persons with the majority of votes, 
whether or not these constituted more than half of all votes
xxxvii
, reportedly wins the 
elections.  
 
The situation in the printing factory, ownership? which started elections in 1996, , 
Same questions for the first factory apply to this one. differs in that the three 
candidates for trade union chair were all managers, rather than workers, and 
nominated by the enterprise management rather than by the workers. All three were 
required to make speeches and drew lots to decide who would speak first. The trade 
union members cast their votes in public using voting slips, leaving room for others to 
see how individuals were voting. Not sure what it means. What are voting slips? Aare 
not these secret ballot? The elected trade union chair then handpicked the trade union 
committee, appointing two of his former rivals
xxxviii
.  According to the town trade 
union chair What did the town trade union do when this factory had its election? 
Shouldn’t it have monitored the election? The town trade union chair sounds as if 
he/she had nothing to do with it. As if it is not his business. That’s a problem isn’t it? , 
the processes in this factory were `not as democratic as elsewhere’, where direct 
elections were held for the trade union representatives, then trade union committee, 
and then indirectly for the trade union chair
xxxix
. In practice, therefore, there is 
considerable elasticity in the meanings given to direct elections, ranging from free 
nomination of candidates by workers at one end, as in the clothing factory, to 
nomination of candidates by enterprise managers or higher-trade union authorities, as 
in the printing factory. Those officials with a clearer perspective on what constitutes a 
genuine election underline the importance of `sea elections’, as used in village 
elections, as a key distinguishing feature of a democratic direct election.  
 
Apart from these political factors there are also institutional reasons for the slow and 
uneven spread of direct, democratic elections. First, when the economic reformers led 
by Deng Xiaoping set about reinvigorating the economy, they also took steps to 
revitalise the ACFTU so as to reassert control over workers for production. As part of 
this process, Document No. 24 was issued in 1981. This gave enterprise trade union 
chairs the same treatment in terms of salary, benefits (car, bigger flat etc) and status as 
a vice-Party secretary or vice-director in the enterprise. This brought grassroots trade 
union cadres in state-owned enterprises into the management scope of the higher level 
Party committee, on the one hand raising their status but on the other hand assuring 
Party control over them.  
 
Direct elections open up the possibility for workers to become trade union chairs and 
so threaten trade union vested interests in state enterprises. As a worker is not a cadre, 
and thus cannot fall under the management of the higher level Party committee, 
introducing direct elections would seriously undermine this system. By removing the 
benefits enjoyed by state-owned enterprise trade union chairs, there would be no 
incentive for anyone to take up this position. As a senior provincial trade union 
official explained, enterprise Party committees and trade union chairs in state-owned 
enterprises have a vested interest in maintaining this status quo and resisting any 
attempts to introduce genuine elections
xl
. For this reason it had been much easier to 
press ahead with direct elections in say Guangdong or Zhejiang provinces, where 
foreign-invested enterprises predominate, than in provinces where state enterprises 
were more numerous. Of course the issue is not just about the status of workers versus 
cadres, as in the early 1950s the ACFTU recruited many workers into leadership 
positions (Lee 1986: 44-46). Though it is not often openly articulated, the issue 
revolves as much around the idea of a rural, migrant worker becoming an urban cadre. 
 
Where direct elections have taken place, the dilemma of whether a worker can 
become a cadre has been handled in different ways. In some foreign enterprises, 
newly directly elected trade union chairs are given the status of cadres. For example, 
in a printing factory in town H, the elected trade union chair, a former migrant worker, 
enjoyed the salary and benefits of a deputy director
xli
. Similarly in a foreign-invested 
clothing factory, the elected vice-chair of the trade union was placed on the salary 
scale of a cadre, though he was previously a migrant worker from Hubei province
xlii
.  
However some trade union officials are reluctant for workers to assume positions of 
trade union cadres. For example, the vice-head of the province A Bureau for the 
Construction of Grassroots Organisations explained that in recently established trade 
unions, they let the enterprise director nominate candidates and recommended them to 
choose a middle-level cadre rather than a worker
xliii
. In his view workers in labour-
intensive industries such as clothing lacked democratic and working-class 
consciousness and therefore were not qualified to be trade union cadres. His 
underlying concern was probably that leaders elected by workers would be less 
malleable than those nominated by the Party.  
 
The second institutional factor affecting the pace of reform relates to the relatively 
closed and conservative nature of the ACFTU. Compared to the ACWF national and 
provincial cadres in the ACFTU have had far less exposure to labour organising 
internationally.  The 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women was a watershed for 
the ACWF, providing national and provincial cadres with opportunities to travel and 
exchange with women activists and learn about different issues, ways of organising 
and framing concepts. The reluctance of the international trade union movement to 
engage with the ACFTU has contributed to this persisting conservatism. Why this 
matters is that ACFTU leaders have little experience or vision of what an effective, 
grassroots trade union  cadre would look like. As stated earlier, the ACFTU has not 
had to mobilise workers or struggle to set up trade unions. When faced with these 
tasks in the reform period, it remains poorly equipped to do this. Though the idea of 
directly electing workers is a step in the direction of a more responsive trade union, 
the advocates of this are less clear about how the grassroots cadre should actually 
operate once elected. Indeed the radical potential of the idea becomes undermined 
when higher-levels of the trade union then set about training the newly elected cadres 
in the functions of the ACFTU, reining them in and disciplining them to conform to a 
certain model of trade union activism.  
 
Interviews with trade union leaders in enterprises that are noted by the local trade 
unions to be models for direct elections suggest that elected trade union leaders soon 
learn to prioritise production over workers’ interests. For example, in a discussion 
with a trade union chair and vice-chair in a foreign-invested clothing factory [Is this 
one of the factories described above?] , it was striking that they did not consider their 
role in persuading workers to work excessive overtime as problematic
xliv
. Similarly 
their focus on welfare issues, such as the quality of food, dormitory conditions and 
entertainment rather than on hours of work or wages suggest the ongoing reproduction 
of the trade union as usual. In a printing factory in town H [which printing factory? 
One of those described above?] , the trade union chair explained how they organised 
activities for workers during the slack season so that they would not seek employment 
elsewhere, thus again facilitating production goals. Similarly the elected chair of the 
clothing factory in town H explained the role of the union in cultivating loyalty and 
identity amongst migrant workers. In his words ` of course, the future trade union 
needs to change the attitude of workers, …that is, change a worker from someone 
who is outside of society to someone who is an enterprise person, for example, love 
their job, love their factory…’xlv.  
 
This is further complicated by the third institutional factor, namely, the anomaly in 
trade union membership conditions, whereby from the 1950s onwards any salaried, 
permanent staff in the enterprise, be they manual or mental workers, could become 
trade union members (Lee 1986: 48, 115)
xlvi
. This has led to the paradoxical situation 
in which managers stand for election and become elected as trade union chairs, as 
described in the printing factory earlier. For example, in a factory in province B the 
existing directly elected trade union chair was a relative of the factory owner. The 
owner agreed to have sea elections for the chair position and the workers elected the 
existing trade union chair. As she was also a salaried staff member of the factory, the 
higher-level trade union could not object to her nomination. Furthermore as this was 
an export company with above average salary levels and working conditions, the 
union was loathe to intervene. Its response was to note this but not use this factory as 
a model for emulation. Similarly, in one enterprise in town K in province B the 
general manager won the election for trade union chair. The trade union initially 
cancelled these results. However, the higher level trade union overruled this, arguing 
that the person with the most votes, whether worker or manager, should win 
(Nanfangdu Shibao, 2003). Interviews with other trade union cadres also revealed 
similar anomalies, which reflect the lack of class analysis within the ACFTU and the 
unwillingness of trade union cadres to confront both more powerful higher levels in 
the union and factory owners.  
 
Finally the progress of the direct elections has been hamstrung by the structural 
relations between the Party, ACFTU and business at the local level. Party leaders, 
trade union leaders and enterprise owners have colluded to ensure that local 
development is prioritised over workers’ interests. Local governments are keen to 
attract foreign investors, offering numerous policy concessions and the promise of a 
cheap, compliant workforce. If the local trade union were to prioritise too much the 
interests of workers, it would be simultaneously failing in its tasks of promoting 
production, economic growth and ultimately Party interests. As the head of the 
Grassroots Work Section of province B trade union pointed out:  
“You can’t focus only on workers…it doesn’t benefit the enterprise as whole. 
If you mobilise the workers against the boss, then the enterprise may go bankrupt. 
You should promote the interests of capital and you can protect the basic interests of 
workers…”.xlvii  It is this dualist dilemma of balancing the oft contradictory goals of 
production with protecting workers’ interests coupled with the trade union’s weak 
position vis-à-vis capital that not only underpins in part the hesitant approach of the 
central ACFTU to promoting direct elections in foreign enterprises but also holds 
back some trade union officials from advocating more enthusiastically for the 
establishment of trade unions and direct elections in foreign enterprises.  
 
This prioritisation of production goals is reflected in the regulations of province A 
trade union, which specify four situations where it will not permit direct elections. 
These are first, where a TU is newly established; second, where relations in an 
enterprise are tense; third, where workers from one clan or place of origin dominate; 
and finally, in small, family businesses
xlviii
. Clearly these specifications suggest a 
highly risk-averse and contradictory strategy. If relations in an enterprise are tense, 
then having a popular trade union leader who enjoys legitimacy amongst workers 
should be preferable to having a vacuum that opens up the path to spontaneous worker 
action. Underlying this is a deep fear of losing control, both amongst higher-level 
trade union authorities over the grassroots and of the Party over the trade union. In the 
words of a Guangdong trade union official, if a young migrant worker becomes 
elected, “can you control them? You can’t control them at all. The higher-level trade 
union has no way [of controlling them]”xlix.  
 Given that there is no compulsion on local trade unions anywhere in China to hold 
direct elections for grassroots trade union cadres, more conservative trade union 
officials at the provincial or lower levels can sit back and wait for demand to trickle 
up rather than actively promote the idea. For example, the vice-head of the Bureau for 
the Construction of Grassroots Organisations in province A trade union explained 
how they responded to requests from enterprises for a change in trade union 
leadership and left it up to the enterprise as to whether or not they want to hold direct 
elections and what methods they use rather than setting out proactively to promote 
democratic direct elections
l
. Having direct elections becomes thus not a right of 
workers but a `gift’ from the enterprise owner and the higher-level trade union. This 
more passive approach reflects the continued subordination of the trade union to both 
the Party and now to capital. 
 
Political, institutional and structural factors have thus combined to slow down and 
confine the introduction of direct elections to situations that are considered relatively 
safe. Trade union officials navigate a tricky course between the Syclla of Party 
dominance and the Charybdis of the growing power of private capital. This course is 
much more treacherous than in the pre-reform days, when state-owned production 
prevailed, for private entrepreneurs can more easily dismiss any overzealous trade 
union officials.  
  
CONCLUSION 
 
Direct elections have the potential to revitalise the trade union structure from the 
bottom-up by making grassroots trade union cadres more accountable and responsive 
to workers’ interests. With pressure on them to take up the grievances of workers 
grassroots trade union cadres, who would require workers’ support to gain re-election, 
should in theory prioritise workers’ needs and so tilt the balance of interests away 
from the Party. With grassroots trade union cadres more responsive to workers, their 
activities should go beyond welfarism to include negotiation, contestation and 
mobilisation around workers’ claims. In this way the union would move away from 
being a state towards a societal corporatist institution. This is at least what the 
reformist elements in the ACFTU hope for.  
 
In practice, however, we have seen that the idea of direct elections has met resistance 
within the ACFTU itself, from the Party which insists on leadership over the mass 
organisations, and from foreign investors, who, if they accept any trade union 
establishment at all, prefer the status quo to a trade union engaged actively on behalf 
of workers. It has not been possible for the reformers within the ACFTU to 
institutionalise direct elections, leading to considerable variation in electoral practices 
and confusion around what constitutes a genuine democratic election. Even where 
elections have been carried out using the democratic `sea elections’ method, our 
research suggests that new union cadres are soon incorporated into existing trade 
union structures and working style.  
 
The path of the trade union direct elections has thus taken a very different course to 
village elections, which have been institutionalised and generalised across the country. 
On the one hand this reflects the lack of a coherent and cohesive group of visionary 
reformers at different levels with strong links to sympathetic Party leaders and their 
failure to make the case persuasively; on the other hand it underlines the much greater 
sensitivity pertaining to labour issues and trade union reform which puts the Party 
doubly on its guard. Any significant move forwards with direct elections is only likely 
to happen when there is a shift in the political context, either because of regime crisis 
or because of political liberalisation. In the meantime it is likely that conservative 
union officials, who heed more the interests of the Party and factory owners than 
workers, will continue to resist the implementation of elections or manipulate them so 
as to ensure the election of safe candidates. So plus ca change, plus c’est la meme.  
With any fundamental trade union reform still in the distant future, we can expect 
workers to increasingly find their own ways to organise and resist workplace 
exploitation.  
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